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American automobile manufacturers experienced a bitter-sweet time during the 1980s.  On one 
hand, they gained support from the government to prevent mass imports of small cars from 
Japan; while on the other hand, they still lost market share to their Japanese counterparts and 
ever since then, they have been facing fierce competition from the Japanese auto-makers.  To 
better understand today’s competition in the automobile market, it is crucial to study the industry 
in the 1980s when the scope of the market began to change.  This paper focuses mainly on 
studying the compact car market in the 1980s, which was the primary competition field then.  It 
first briefly introduces the rise of Japanese automobile industry, and the economic background of 
the decade.  Then it examines the U.S. compact car segment in detail, and finally constructs a 
model to explain consumer decisions on purchasing compact cars.  In the end, it gives suggestion 
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Unlike other automobile companies in the world, Japanese started their industry by first 
manufacturing trucks.  Trucks dominated the market through the pre-World War II period, with 
orders mainly from military.  Sales were boosted again by the orders from the U.S. Army during 
the Korean War. Although mass production of trucks didn’t help Japanese accumulate 
experience on manufacturing passenger cars, it prepared Japanese manufacturers with enough 
cash reserve for future technology transfer. 
 
Believing automobile industry could stimulate other sectors of the economy, post-War Japanese 
put auto-manufacturers under protection.  Low-interest bank loans kept firms away from 
bankruptcy and investing in car production.  Japanese Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) also exempted them from import duties on machines and tools purchased abroad 
and charged high import taxes on cars imported from America and Europe.  MITI also provided 
the guidance to the development of Japanese passenger car industry.  In 1955, MITI launched a 
“mini-car” proposal accelerated the end of 3-wheel vehicle produced in Japan but the proposal 
also created a “too-many-manufacturers but too small market” problem according to the 
government and company officials.   
 
In 1961, trying to reduce competition in the market, MITI asked car manufacturers to specialize 
in only one type of vehicle: mini-cars, sports cars and other specialty automobiles.  This 
announcement largely shaped the Japanese automobile industry since only small Japanese cars 
(with engine displacement up to 2000cc) remained protected from imports through the 1960s and 
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much of the 1970s.  Since no American cars were this small and many European cars were above 
this limit, nearly all imported cars faced a 34% tax duty and Japanese automakers were finally 
able to export their models.  In 1970, total production in Japan exceeded 5,000,000 units, of 
which 60% were cars and 40% were trucks.   
 
A decade ahead of American counterparts in investing in small cars, Japanese automakers had 
been small-car experts already by 1970.  The unique development pattern put Japanese 
automakers the biggest beneficiary in the upcoming oil crisis as small (or compact) cars 
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The most important factor that influences people’s decision on what type of cars to purchase is 
oil price.  Through 1970 to 2004, the world experienced eight major events that help reshape the 
oil industry as well as the world economy.  From 1960 to 1972, the crude oil price was kept at 
about $3 per barrel (see Figure 2.1).  Since 1974, the crude oil price has kept increasing from 
above $6 per barrel and never dropped below $10 again.  The biggest oil price shock happened in 
1979, when it rose above $10 per barrel and increased at a rate of $10 per year in the following 
subsequent three years and finally reached its highest point of the entire 1980s in 1983, at $32 
per barrel.   
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The accident ended the period of low-price oil supply in the United States.  The impact was huge 
on nearly every manufacturing industry, especially the automobile industry where there was no 
energy substitute for oil and the U.S. was the biggest car-consumption country in the world.   It 
was very clear that high oil price changed people’s consumption habit and opened new 
opportunity for foreign car manufacturers who were specialized in making smaller cars. 
 
As the oil price began climbing since 1970, one big change in the automobile industry was the 
declining sales of full-size and luxury cars (see Figure 2.2).  While both sales of compact cars 
and midsize cars were increasing through the 1970s, compact car sales increased much faster 
than that of midsize cars.  During the subsequent three years of 1979, 1980 and 1981, when oil 
price soared at the fastest rate of the 1980s, the increase of compact car sales over-speeded that 
of midsize cars sales and finally its market share (including import) reached 50%, while the 
market share of full-size and luxury cars fell to around 20%.  Since 1990, while the market share 
of full-size and luxury cars kept at a constant 20% level, midsize cars have become the dominant 
segment.   
 
The explanation for the above change is consumers’ preference shifted from full-size and luxury 
cars to fuel-efficient cars along with the fast-climbing oil price.  Due to limitation from 
technology, the only way to make cars more fuel-efficient was to make it small.  That is why we 
see the increasing market share of compact cars.  We can also deduce that the innovation of 
automobile technology through the 1980s was to make cars more fuel-efficient while bigger.  In 
1990, most car manufacturers successfully upgraded their compact models to mid-size models.  
Also, because of the relatively low oil price compared to the early 1980s, midsize cars became 
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the most popular segment in the market.  However, since oil price was more fluctuating in the 
last two decades and never fell to $3 per barrel as where it was in 1960s again, full-size and 
luxury cars have never won back their past golden age. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Percent of sales in the U.S. by market segmentation     
* Only domestic-made data available. 
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To better examine the change in the passenger car industry after the oil price shock, I focus on 
the study of compact car segment from 1975 to 1989.  I construct the industry profile in Table 2 
including three American automobile-manufacturers: General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor 
Company and the Chrysler Corporation (Former DaimlerCrysler AG), and three Japanese 




Table 3.1 Fifteen-year market data (1975-1989) 
Company name 
Average annual 
unit sales Unit sales growth rate 
Average predicted 
reliability* 
GM 1,505,671 0.029 1.81 
Ford 1,063,240 0.006 2.54 
Chrysler 684,969 0.048 2.63 
Toyota 500,984 0.081 4.97 
Nissan 397,092 0.061 4.28 
Honda 429,848 0.242 4.63 
Average 763,634 0.078 3.48 
* 5 – Much better than average 
   4 – Better than average 
   3 – Average 
   2 – Worse than average 
   1 – Much worse than average 




Although the Big Three had larger annual unit sales of compact cars from 1975 to 1989, their 
sales growth rates were far behind the industry average level.  The main reason was the poor 
quality of American models.  According to the reliability ratings published every December on 
Consumer Reports, none of the average ratings of the Big Three models was above average 
(Table 3.1).   
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Besides high oil price, another important factor that influenced U.S. passenger car industry was 
the trade restraints on Japanese automobiles.  The detail of the restraints was summarized in 
Feenstra (1988).  Beginning April 1981 to 1983, Japanese limited their automobile sales to a 
total of 1,832,500 units, of which 1.68 million were passenger cars.  The quotas were allocated to 
Japanese firms by their government.  From April 1984 to March 1985, the restraints were 
continued and raised to a total of 2.016 million units.  Following this, the Japanese government 
continued the restraint each year at 2.506 million annually from April 1985 to March 1988.  This 
quota included 2.3 million passenger cars.  The U.S. government did not request the latter two 
extensions.  To examine the impact of the trade restrains, I broke down the fifteen-year data into 
three five-year periods, summarizing in the following tables (Table 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4). 
     
 
Table 3.2  Five-year market data I (1975-1979) 
Company name 
Average annual unit 
sales 




GM 1,390,146 0.081 2.15 
Ford 1,221,466 0.044 2.68 
Chrysler 654,053 0.161 2.42 
Toyota 394,607 0.177 5.00 
Nissan 327,008 0.210 3.93 
Honda 221,030 0.570 3.90 
Average 701,385 0.207 3.35 
* 5 – Much better than average 
   4 – Better than average 
   3 – Average 
   2 – Worse than average 
   1 – Much worse than average 
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Table 3.3 Five-year market data II (1980-1984) 
Company name 
Average annual unit 
sales 




GM 1,449,177 0.004 1.27 
Ford 930,776 -0.059 2.78 
Chrysler 669,167 0.061 3.02 
Toyota 521,546 0.002 5.00 
Nissan 436,361 -0.015 4.51 
Honda 404,290 0.080 5.00 
Average 735,220 0.012 3.60 
* 5 – Much better than average 
   4 – Better than average 
   3 – Average 
   2 – Worse than average 
   1 – Much worse than average 




Table 3.4  Five-year market data III (1985-1989) 
Company name 
Average annual unit 
sales 




GM 1,677,689 0.003 2.01 
Ford 1,037,477 0.032 2.16 
Chrysler 731,686 -0.078 2.46 
Toyota 586,800 0.064 4.92 
Nissan 427,908 -0.011 4.40 
Honda 664,223 0.074 5.00 
Average 854,297 0.014 3.49 
* 5 – Much better than average 
   4 – Better than average 
   3 – Average 
   2 – Worse than average 
   1 – Much worse than average 




Although the intension of the trade restraints was to protect domestic car-manufacturers, the Big 
Three still experienced a lower sales growth rates during the trade restraints period, compared to 
the period from 1975 to 1979.  One explanation is the consumers were more prudent when 
spending money on cars when they faced high-rocketed oil price.  They might delay purchasing 
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new models.  Another explanation is consumers still kept buying Japanese cars because their 
compact models were more reliable even though the imported ones might be more expensive.  
The trade restraints actually intrigued the Japanese manufacturers to improve their product 
quality.  Nissan’s ratings were raised from an average 3.93 (1975-1979) to 4.51 (1980-1984); 
Honda’s rating was from 3.90 (1975-1979) to 5.00 (1980-1984).  However, the quality ratings of 
the Big Three models were still below average in the trade restraints period.   
 
The competition between three Japanese firms was also fierce.  Nissan, which had the lowest 
quality rating among the Japanese three, had a negative sales growth rate both in the period of 
1980-1984 and 1985-1989. Because of the trade restraints, all of the three Japanese firms 
experienced a sharp decrease in unit sales growth rate from 1980 to 1984.  However, Honda 
remained a higher growth rate than its other two counterparts.  The reason was Honda built up its 
first transplants in the U.S. and started producing domestic-made cars in 1983.  In order to 
expand market share, Nissan and Toyota began producing cars domestically in 1985 and 1986, 
respectively.  The result was their sales growth rates bounced back even though the restraint was 
more stringent.   
 
As indicated in the previous paragraphs, the Big Three adjusted too slow to the market change 
and never succeeded in launching a good-quality model.  They did not show interest in compact 
cars before the 1979 oil crisis.  As Table 3.5 shows, GM was the first U.S. manufacturer that 
responded to the increasing oil price by introducing more compact models to the market.  Ford 
and Chrysler followed the same strategy, which was easy to understand – more models could 
satisfy more diversified demands and thus helped firms gain more market shares.  But poor 
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quality of American cars had a negative impact on the consumers’ choice.  To give readers a 
better idea of the change pattern in the market, I list the number of the models of the Big Three 
and the three Japanese manufacturers that exited the market.  More American models exited the 
market after 1984, when the trade restraints officially ended.  The large exit rate also affected the 
sales growth rate.  GM, with an exit of 13 models between 1985 and 1989, experienced a decline 
of annual sales growth rate from 0.04 of 1980-1984 to 0.03 of 1985-1989.  Chrysler was even 
worse.  Its annual sales growth rate declined from 0.061 of 1980-1984 to -0.078 of 1985-1989 
while six models exited the market between 1985 and 1989.  
 
Table 3.5 Numbers of models of Big Three 
Year GM Ford Chrysler 
1970 5 5 2 
1971 6 5 4 
1972 7 5 4 
1973 8 5 4 
1974 12 7 4 
1975 14 8 5 
1976 14 8 7 
1977 14 9 9 
1978 13 9 9 
1979 12 9 9 
1980 11 11 11 
1981 12 11 10 
1982 12 8 12 
1983 13 10 16 
1984 17 7 16 
1985 17 7 16 
1986 17 6 19 
1987 17 6 19 
1988 17 7 16 
1989 14 7 16 
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10 years  
GM 3 4 13 5 24 9 37.50% 
Ford 0 8 3 2 15 8 53.33% 
Chrysler 2 3 6 2 22 6 27.27% 
Toyota 1 1 3 3 8 5 62.50% 
Nissan 2 1 2 2 8 4 50.00% 
Honda 0 0 2 2 5 4 80.00% 




Another way to measure models’ performance was their market life.  The last three columns of 
Table 3.6 lists the number of models exited in or after 1989, the number of models (exited in or 
after 1989) whose market life longer than 10 years and the ratio of the two.  GM and Chrysler 
had the largest number of models that exited the market after 1989, and fewer of them had a 
market life longer than 10 years.  Figure 3.1 shows the predicted reliability from 1975 to 2004 of 
the six car manufacturers.  Toyota and Honda always had an above-average rating in the 
industry; Nissan performed a declining reliability; GM and Ford performed a increasing 
reliability with Ford having a faster rate; Chrysler performed the most volatile one.  The better 
the reliability, the lower the exit rate.  It demonstrates the importance of the role of quality 
playing in the passenger car industry.  
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Figure 3.1 Predicted reliability (1975-2004) 
Note:  5 – Much better than average; 
           4 – Better than average; 
 3 – Average; 
 2 – Worse than average;  
 1 – Much worse than average 




The Big Three were not compact car experts either.  In the 1980s, all the three manufacturers had 
captive imports, most of which were produced by Japanese manufacturers.  The quality ratings of 
those import captives were better than the overall average ratings of the Big Three models.  The 
reason that Chrysler had a better quality rating among the three was it had more captive imports 
from Japan.  Table 3.7 shows the lower average ratings of the Big Three models if we exclude 
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 Table 3.7 Captive imports of the Big Three 
Import captive Average rating 
GM (1975-2004), with captive imports 
                              w/o captive imports 
2.19 
1.97 
Chevrolet Sprint (1984-1988) 
Chevrolet Spectrum (1984-1988) 
Geo Prizm (1985-2002) 





Ford (1975-2004), with captive imports 
                               w/o captive imports 
2.68 
2.65 
Ford Fiesta (1977-1981) 4.33 
Chrysler (1975-2004), with captive imports 
                                      w/o captive imports 
2.77 
2.45 
Plymouth Arrow (1977-1980) 4.00 
Plymouth Sapporo (Conquest) (1977-1987) 4.20 
Plymouth Vista (1983-1990) 3.38 
Dodge Challenger (Conquest) (1977-1987) 4.20 
Dodge Vista (1983-1990) 3.17 
Dodge Colt (1977-1995) 4.39 





Figure 3.2 Share of U.S. Automobile Market 
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Figure 3.2 shows the increase of market share of Japanese car manufacturers.  Also, it shows 
GM, whose compact cars had the worst quality ratings, had a steadily decreasing market share in 
the 1980s.  But poor quality was not the only reason that dragged down the market share of the 
Big Three: GM’s quality ratings increased in the late 1980s, but it didn’t help GM stop losing 
market share.  One possible explanation was the decreasing brand loyalty.  Because Japanese 
manufacturers established strong reputation in the oil-price-skyrocketed period, consumers were 
more likely to stay with the choice of Japanese cars even though the oil price began declining in 
the late 1980s.  This loyalty was not only applied to the compact categories.  We see the three 
Japanese manufacturers upgraded some of their compact cars in 1990 to midsize ones to compete 
in the midsize market, which was more profitable than the compact car segment.  The reputation 


























- 15 - 




Cars are durable goods.  When consumers make decisions on what brand or model to buy, they 
are more scrutinized and less influenced by advertisement only.  Instead, they rely more on their 
own financial situation, fuel price as well as “word-of-mouth” reputations.  Because of advanced 
information channels, consumers are able to gain insightful knowledge of future economy and 
different models of passenger cars.  In this section, I constructed a linear model considering both 
fuel price and cars’ reputation.  Although there are other factors, such as household income and 
personal taste that affect the consumption decision, the measurement of those factors is beyond 





!""""# +$+$+$+$+= %%%              (1) 
 
Equation (1) above shows the linear model used to test reputation and fuel price on consumption 
decision. Carsi,t denotes the sales of model i in time period t, ∆Carsi,t-1 denotes the sales 
difference of model i between period t-1 and period t-2, while ∆Carsi,t-2 denotes the sales 
difference of model i between period t-2 and period t-3.  By including these two variables in the 
model we can testify the effect of accumulated over-the-years reputation on consumers’ decision 
on car purchasing.  We can expect the larger the positive difference, which means more people 
bought the model in the previous period, the larger sales of the model in the current period.  The 
third and fourth variables ∆Oilt and ∆Oilt-1 denote the oil price changes in current period t and 
previous period t-1, respectively.  They measure the fuel price impact on compact car 
consumption decision.  We can expect the larger the positive change in oil price, the more sales 
of compact cars.  It is clear that current consumption decisions rely heavily on the results from 
the previous periods other than from the current one, because information need time to be 
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transferred to the consumers and people need time to process that information.  This model also 
tests whether the information from the older or the newer previous periods has more influence on 
consumers’ decision.   
 
The cars sales data used here are from the following five models: Chevrolet Camaro, Pontiac 
Firebird, Ford Mustang, Honda Accord and Toyota Camry and t starts from 1975 to 1989, totally 
fifteen observations for each model.  The regression results are shown as follows: 
 
 
Table 4.1 Regression result of Chevrolet Camaro 
 
     Source  |        SS             df            MS                  Number of obs =      15 
-------------+---------------------------------------            F(  4,    10)  =      3.50 
      Model |  1.9003e+10     4     4.7508e+09             Prob > F        =      0.0492 
  Residual  |  1.3576e+10    10    1.3576e+09             R-squared       =      0.5833 
------------ +---------------------------------------            Adj R-squared  =      0.4166 
        Total |  3.2579e+10    14     2.3271e+09             Root MSE        =      36846 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        CarsCCt |       Coef.       Std. Err.        t       P>|t|        [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  dCarsCCt_1 |   .7661045   .2729689     2.81    0.019     .1578919    1.374317 
  dCarsCCt_2 |   .2103243   .2427766     0.87    0.407    -.3306156    .7512642 
              dOilt |  -714.1951   2166.237    -0.33   0.748    -5540.872    4112.482 
          dOilt_1 |   2370.995   2085.638     1.14    0.282    -2276.095    7018.086 
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Table 4.2 Regression result of Pontiac Firebird 
 
      Source |          SS           df          MS               Number of obs =       15 
-------------+---------------------------------------            F(  4,    10)   =       3.26 
       Model |  1.0383e+10     4    2.5956e+09            Prob > F        =       0.0592 
   Residual |  7.9714e+09    10   797139850            R-squared       =       0.5657 
-------------+----------------------------------------            Adj R-squared  =       0.3920 
        Total |  1.8354e+10    14    1.3110e+09            Root MSE        =       28234 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        CarsPFt |       Coef.       Std. Err.        t        P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  dCarsPFt_1 |   .8517129   .2864651     2.97    0.014     .2134289    1.489997 
  dCarsPFt_2 |   .2822659   .2615318     1.08    0.306    -.3004632    .8649951 
             dOilt |   246.2037   1639.076     0.15    0.884    -3405.885    3898.292 
         dOilt_1 |   2725.694   1655.949     1.65    0.131    -963.9909     6415.38 





Table 4.3 Regression result of Ford Mustang 
 
      Source |          SS           df          MS               Number of obs =    15 
-------------+----------------------------------------            F(  4,    10)   =    1.79 
       Model |  1.2076e+10     4    3.0190e+09            Prob > F        =    0.2067 
   Residual |  1.6831e+10    10   1.6831e+09            R-squared       =    0.4178 
-------------+----------------------------------------            Adj R-squared  =    0.1849 
        Total |   2.8907e+10    14   2.0648e+09            Root MSE        =    41026 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        CarsFMt |      Coef.        Std. Err.        t        P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  dCarsFMt_1 |    .386574    .1927481     2.01    0.073    -.0428955    .8160436 
  dCarsFMt_2 |   .1279268   .2024444     0.63    0.542    -.3231475    .5790011 
              dOilt |   2664.326   2325.984     1.15    0.279     -2518.29      7846.941 
         dOilt_1 |    97.27946   2187.631     0.04    0.965     -4777.067    4971.626 
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Table 4.4 Regression result of Honda Accord 
 
      Source |          SS           df           MS               Number of obs =      15 
-------------+-----------------------------------------          F(  4,    10)   =      2.25 
       Model |  9.1000e+10     4     2.2750e+10            Prob > F        =      0.1362 
   Residual |  1.0117e+11    10    1.0117e+10            R-squared       =      0.4735 
-------------+-----------------------------------------          Adj R-squared  =      0.2630 
        Total |   1.9217e+11    14    1.3726e+10            Root MSE        =      1.0e+0 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        CarsHAt |      Coef.        Std. Err.        t       P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  dCarsHAt_1 |  -.8410398   2.270045    -0.37   0.719    -5.899016    4.216936 
  dCarsHAt_2 |   3.444594   1.562879     2.20    0.052    -.0377183    6.926907 
              dOilt |  -3224.213   6979.957    -0.46   0.654    -18776.53     12328.1 
          dOilt_1 |  -14847.92   8807.567    -1.69   0.123     -34472.4    4776.566 





Table 4.5 Regression result of Toyota Camry 
 
     Source |          SS           df            MS               Number of obs =      15 
-------------+----------------------------------------            F(  4,    10)   =      7.84 
      Model |  6.8354e+10      4     1.7089e+10            Prob > F        =      0.0040 
  Residual |   2.1798e+10    10    2.1798e+09            R-squared       =      0.7582 
-------------+----------------------------------------            Adj R-squared  =      0.6615 
       Total |   9.0152e+10    14     6.4395e+09            Root MSE        =      46689 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        CarsTCt |       Coef.       Std. Err.        t      P>|t|        [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  dCarsTCt_1 |     1.61071   .6459885     2.49    0.032     .1713574    3.050062 
  dCarsTCt_2 |   1.383092   .6816237     2.03    0.070    -.1356606    2.901844 
              dOilt |     729.815   2579.753     0.28   0.783    -5018.234    6477.864 
          dOilt_1 |      -3640.9   2672.391   -1.36    0.203    -9595.359    2313.559 





As the discussion of the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables before, the four coefficients β1, β2, β3 and β4 are expected to be positive.  Thus, the 
model better explained the sales of Chevrolet Camaro, Pontiac Firebird, Ford Mustang and 
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Toyota Camry than that of Honda Accord.  Also, the p-values show consumers depended more 
on previous years’ sales performance than the oil price change.  It indicates that, even during the 
period that oil price was not skyrocketed, consumers still showed preference to cars that had 
good reputation.  Furthermore, the p-values also show the sales performance one period before 
the current one played a more important role than that of older periods in consumers’ decision-
making. 
 
The model’s failure of explaining the sales of Honda Accord can be the result of strong growth 
of the model since entering the market in 1975 (see Figure 4.1) and its reputation developed by 
Honda’s other U.S.-made models (Honda was the first Japanese manufacturers that built 































































                             Figure 4.1 Unit sales of chosen models  (1972 - 1989) 
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The whole 1980s was a period for American auto-makers to accumulate bad reputation of their 
models while their Japanese counterparts did just the opposite.  The quality of the models of the 
Big Three remained below average for about fifteen years.  Once the bad reputation establishes, 
it is hard to win consumers’ trust again, which is one of the reason for the failures of the Big 
Three to catch up with the Japanese in the 2000s even though their quality ratings have been 
improved.  However, the quality of American cars is still far behind that of the Japanese.   
 
Auto industry is a commodity industry.  The core competence of an auto company is the product, 
not the service or any cost saving techniques.  The strategy to be outstanding in the industry is to 
provide the consumers first-class-quality cars.  Reducing cost only cannot win the consumers 
back because the life of cars last more than one year and consumers purchase the car for future 
use.  From the evidence presented in this paper, even though in the first five years of 1980s when 
the U.S. restrained imports from Japan, it didn’t deter consumers’ decision on buying more 
expensive Japanese cars because of their superior reliability.  This can be a good example to 
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